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Abstract: Since sufferings of civilian populations during the First World War in Eu-
rope, especially war crimes perpetrated against civilians, have – unlike the political 
and military history of the Great War – only recently become an object of scholarly 
interest, there still are considerable gaps in our knowledge, the Balkans being a salient 
example. Therefore, suggesting a methodology that involves a comparative approach, 
the use of all available sources, cooperation among scholars from different countries 
and attention to the historical background, the paper seeks to open some questions 
and start filling lacunae in our knowledge of the war crimes perpetrated against Serb 
civilians as part of the policy of Bulgarization in the portions of Serbia under Bulgar-
ian military occupation. 
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Crimes against civilian populations in the First World War
T
he political and military history of the First World War is very well 
known; however, today, nearly a century later, the history of civilian 
populations in Europe, especially those under military occupation, and their 
sufferings still lacks a thorough investigation. For about seventy years, ste-
reotypes like “trench war”, the “Sarajevo murder”, the battle of Verdun, and 
many others, tended to predominate in all studies dealing with the Great 
War; for a long time, even the generally accepted “Total War” theory virtu-
ally neglected war crimes perpetrated against civilians. This situation has 
begun to change about twenty years ago owing to the effort of a few Euro-
pean scholars whose focus on new important issues has given us a chance 
to observe the Great War from other perspectives. It is now clear beyond 
doubt that such crimes, along with the policy of extermination and deporta-
tion (and, in general, with every war strategy in which civilians were chosen 
as a target), were frequent during the First World War.
The main credit for this change of view should no doubt be giv-
en to scholars working for the Historial de la Grande Guerre in Peronne, 
France. Annette Becker, Stéphane Audoine-Rouzeau, Philippe Nivet and 
others wrote books about the situation in the occupied territories of France 
that ought to be considered as fundamental reading for all historians con-
cerned with the study of the condition of civilians in the First World War in 
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Europe;1 at the same time, some non-French authors, such as Alan Kramer, 
John Horne, Peter Liddle, Hugh Cecile and others, have focused their stud-
ies on Belgium.2 In this case too, their work is something of a basic gram-
mar for us, not only because they have been the first to study civilians under 
occupations in a profound manner, but also because their method can be 
used in our work as well. Paul Gatrell, Ian Whitehead and others focus their 
attention on Russia and central-eastern Europe,3 and there generally are 
many publications in main European languages,4 as well as many publica-
tions on the Armenian genocide.5
As far as the Balkans is concerned, however, there still is a regrettably 
large lacuna. Very few studies focus on Serbia, Greece and Montenegro 
(and Romania too), except for some recent ones, among which the most 
relevant are Bruna Bianchi’s studies about Serbia.6 These publications are 
1 Among the main works are Annette Becker, Oubliés de la Grande Guerre. Humanitaire 
et culture de guerre, populations occupées, déportés civils, prisonniers de guerre (Paris: Noê-
sis, 1998); Stéphane Audoin-Rouzeau, L’Enfant de l’ennemi (Paris: Aubier Collection 
historique, 1995); Philippe Nivet, Les réfugiés français de la Grande Guerre (1914–1920) 
(Paris: Economica, 2004). 
2 Hugh Cecil & Peter Liddle, eds., Facing Armageddon. The First World War Experienced, 
2 ed. (London: Pen & Sword, 2003); John Horne & Alan Kramer, German atrocities 
1914: A history of denial (New Haven – London: Yale University Press, 2001); L. Zuck-
erman, The Rape of Belgium. The Untold Story of World War I (New York – London: New 
York University Press, 2004).
3 Paul Gatrell, A Whole Empire Walking. Refugees in Russia during World War I (Bloom-
ington: Indiana University Press, 2005); Eric Lohr, Nationalizing the Russian Empire. 
The Campaign against Enemy Aliens during World War I (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard 
University Press, 2003); Peter Liddle, John Bourne & Ian Whitehead, eds., The Great 
World War 1914–1945, vol. 1: Lightning Strikes Twice (London: Harper Collins, 2000); 
V. G Liulevicius, Kriegsland im Osten. Eroberung, Kolonisierung und Militärherrschaft im 
Ersten Weltkrieg (Hamburg: Hamburger Edition, 2002).
4 A very important volume is Bruna Bianchi, ed., La violenza contro la popolazione civile 
nella Grande Guerra (Milan: Unicopli, 2006). For an exhaustive bibliography on crimes 
during WWI, see Oswald Überegger, “Le atrocità nella prima guerra mondiale. Saggio 
storico-bibliografico e bibliografia scelta”, DEP 7 (2007), 232–259 (www.unive.it/dep).
5 The question of Armenian genocide being a very complicated one, the reader is re-
ferred to the site www.armenian-genocide.org. 
6 Among the main works are “Crimini di guerra e crimini contro l’umanità. Le stragi sul 
fronte orientale e balcanico”, in Giovanna Procacci, Marc Silver & Lorenzo Bertuccelli, 
eds., Le stragi rimosse. Storia, memoria pubblica, scritture (Milan: Unicopli, 2008), 19–39; 
“La violenza contro la popolazione civile serba negli scritti di Rodolphe Archibald Reiss 
1914–1924”, in Giulia Albanese, ed., L’intellettuale militante. Scritti per Mario Isnenghi 
(Portogruaro: Nuova Dimensione, 2008), 179–197; “Les violations des conventions in-
ternationales en Serbie de la part de l’armée austro-hongroise et bulgare 1914–1918”, in M. Pisarri, Bulgarian Crimes against Civilians in Occupied Serbia 359
extremely important, but it must be said that the scholars only used sources 
written in languages they can understand.7
Of course, this is not the only reason why this question is still so little 
known in Europe. In fact, no history of crimes against civilians perpetrated 
on the soil of the Kingdom of Serbia has crossed the borders of today’s 
Serbia ever before; it should be noted here that there seems to be among 
Serbian historians, unlike their colleagues in Italy or France, a reluctance or 
unwillingness to go deeper into such questions, still less to “export” them 
and facilitate comparative approaches or suggestions from non-Serbian his-
torians. Relevant publications by those who can understand Serbian are still 
predominant, and there does not seem to be much communication with 
foreign colleagues.8
Even so, there is still a lot of work to be done in Serbia as well. Among 
studies about civilian suffering in the Great War in Serbia, the Austro-
Hungarian occupation has always been in the centre of attention of Serbian 
authors, mostly because of the greater availability of source material.9 On 
the other hand, there is a critical lack of information about the role played 
Frédéric Rousseau & Burghart Schmidt, eds., Les Dérapages de la guerre. Du XVI siècle 
à nos jours (Hamburg: DOBU Verlag, 2009), 172–186; “Gli stupri di massa in Serbia 
durante la Prima guerra mondiale”, in Marcello Flores, ed., Stupri di guerra. La violenza 
di massa contro le donne nel Novecento (Milan: Angeli, 2010), 43–60; “Le torture inflitte 
ai civili nella Serbia occupata”, in Lauso Zagato & Simona Pinton, eds., La tortura 
nel nuovo millennio. La reazione del diritto (Padua: CEDAM, 2010), 131–150. See also 
Charles Fryer, The Destruction of Serbia in 1915 (New York: Columbia University Press, 
1997); Mieczysłav B. Biskupski, Ideology, Politics and Diplomacy in East Central Europe 
(Rochester: University of Rochester Press, 2003), esp. the chapter “Strategy, Politics, 
and Suffering: The Wartime Relief of Belgium, Serbia, and Poland, 1914–1918”, 31–57; 
Frédéric Le Moal, La Serbie: du martyre à la victoire (Paris: 14-18 Editions, 2008).
7 E.g. Rapport de la Commission interalliée sur les violations des Conventions de la Haye et 
le Droit International en général, commises de 1915–1918 par les Bulgares en Serbie occupée. 
Documents (Paris 1919); the works of Rodolphe Archibald Reiss; Dragolioub Yovano-
vitch, Les effets économiques et sociaux de la guerre en Serbie (Paris: Presses Universitaires 
de France & New Haven: Yale University Press, 1928); etc.
8 One of the rare exceptions is Andrej Mitrović, Srbija u Prvom svetskom ratu (Belgrade: 
Srpska književna zadruga, 1984), published in English twenty-three years after its first 
Serbian edition: Serbia’s Great War, 1914–1918 (London: Hurst & Company, 2007).
9 Among the main studies on Austro-Hungarian occupation are Božica Mladenović, 
Grad u austrougarskoj okupacionoj zoni u Srbiji od 1916. do 1918. godine (Belgrade: Čigoja 
štampa, 2000), and her Porodica u Srbiji u Prvom svetskom ratu (Belgrade: Istorijski in-
stitut, 2005); as well as the collections of papers from several conferences: Srbija 1916. 
godine,  Zbornik radova no. 5 (Belgrade: Istorijski institut, 1987); Srbija 1917. godine, 
Zbornik radova no. 6 (Belgrade: Istorijski institut, 1988); Srbija 1918. godine i stvaranje 
jugoslovenske države, Zbornik radova no. 7 (Belgrade: Istorijski institut, 1989).Balcanica XLIV (2013) 360
by the other occupying force, Bulgaria;10 in this case, studies are focused on 
the Toplica Uprising (Toplički ustanak), an insurrection of Serbian people 
in 1917, and its consequences, while more exhaustive publications on the 
general situation are mostly lacking.11
What is the reason for this? This is not an easy question to answer, 
especially if we know that there are a lot of sources for the Bulgarian oc-
cupation to work with. First of all, the monumental documentation of the 
Inter-Allied Commission, of which its report is but a small part. It includes 
reports, victims’ testimonies and a large amount of original Bulgarian mate-
rial produced by both the military and civilian Bulgarian administrations of 
the occupied territories of Serbia. This documentation is entirely preserved 
in the fonds of the Archives of Serbia in Belgrade titled Arhiva institucija 
pod bugarskom okupacijom (The Archive of Institutions under Bulgarian 
Occupation), and while it is officially inaccessible today, we cannot argue 
that it was so in the past.12 Furthermore, a consistent part of it (copies and 
original Bulgarian documents) is preserved and accessible in the Archives 
of  Yugoslavia:  Fonds  Ministarstvo  inostranih  poslova  Kraljevine  SHS, 
Direkcija za ugovore (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Kingdom of Serbs, 
Croats and Slovenes (SCS), Office of Agreements). Primary sources can 
also be found in other collections in both archives; in the Archives of Ser-
bia: Ministarstvo inostranih dela, Političko odeljenje (Ministry for Foreign 
Affairs, Political Department); in the Archives of Yugoslavia: Delegacija 
Kraljevine SHS na Konferenciji mira (Delegation of the Kingdom of SCS 
at the Peace Conference), Ministarstvo unutrašnjih poslova (Ministry of the 
Interior), Ministarstvo vera (Ministry for Religious Affairs) and in many 
10 Even though Germans were present in the occupied Kingdom of Serbia, we cannot 
consider them as an occupying force in the true sense of the word. 
11 On the Toplica Uprising: Milivoje Perović, Toplički ustanak (Belgrade: Vojno delo, 
1959);  Andrej  Mitrović,  Toplički  ustanak.  Mesto  u  srpskoj  istoriji  (Belgrade:  SANU, 
1993); Božica Mladenović, Žena u Topličkom ustanku (Belgrade: Socijalna misao, 1996). 
Among the studies on Bulgarian occupation: Vladimir Stojančević, Srbija i srpski narod 
za vreme rata i okupacije 1914–1918 (Leskovac: Biblioteka Narodnog muzeja u Lesko-
vcu, 1988).
12 I personally tried a few times to obtain access to the fonds, but to no avail. Some 
authors used this documentation in the past: Sevdelin Andrejević, “Ekonomska pljačka 
Srbije za vreme bugarske okupacije”, in Srbija 1918. godine, 19–34; Božica Mladenović, 
“Odštetni zahtevi Srbije prema Bugarskoj”, in Srbija na kraju Prvog svetskog rata, Zbornik 
radova no. 8 (Belgrade: Istorijski institut, 1989), 101–104; A. Turović & N. Ivanović, Le-
skovac i leskovački kraj 1915–1918 (Leskovac: Istorijski arhiv, 2006); Sladjana Bojković 
& Miloje Pršić, Stradanje srpskog naroda u Srbiji 1914–1918 (Belgrade: Istorijski muzej 
Srbije, 2000), a collection of documents from Serbian archives which brings 19 docu-
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others. Moreover, important documents are also likely to be found in local 
archives, such as those of the cities of Niš or Požarevac, but we did not have 
the opportunity to verify this assumption.
Literature is also an important resource, and it is available in major 
Serbian libraries, such as the National Library of Serbia and the University 
Library in Belgrade, and the Matica Srpska Library in Novi Sad. What we 
have in mind here are not only some wartime and post-war publications, 
which are among the main sources for Serbian historians today,13 but also 
the republished Bulgarian works relating to the same period, such as Prime 
Minister Radoslavov’s diary (years 1914–1915), reports submitted by the 
official scientific expedition in 1916 whose mission was to find corroborat-
ing evidence for the alleged Bulgarian nature of the Morava region and 
Macedonia, and so on.14 Finally, an extremely important source that is sadly 
still underexploited is the vast amount of information available online: sci-
entific works, documents and books in digital format (especially those from 
the war and post-war periods that cannot be found in libraries).15
There is also the material generated by the Bulgarian military and 
civil authorities which is preserved in the Bulgarian archives, in Sofia and 
in Veliko Tŭrnovo. This material is undoubtedly the most important, but 
it seems it is still unavailable. This cannot be an excuse for not studying 
the Bulgarian occupation and crimes, of course, because we should first use 
what we do have at our disposal – and, as mentioned before, the quantity 
of available information is not at all insignificant. First of all, we have to 
look at it from the standpoint of approach and methodology; namely, even 
if Bulgarian documents were available, we probably would not be able to 
understand and use them properly without first analyzing the materials of 
the Inter-Allied Commission, Archibald Reiss’s inquiries and other reports, 
and also without learning about the crimes committed in other parts of Eu-
rope or, in other words, about the work and methodology of other European 
historians. Nor can the rejection by Bulgarian historiography of Bulgaria’s 
13 Sreten Dinić, Bugarska zverstva u vranjskom okrugu (Belgrade: Narod, 1921); Jovan 
Hadži Vasiljević, Bugarska zverstva u Vranju i okolini (1915–1918) (Novi Sad: Kulturno-
privredno društvo Vranjalica, 1922); Stevan Maksimović, Uspomene iz okupacije nemačke, 
austrijske i bugarske 1914–1918 (Belgrade: Geca Kon, 1919); Dragiša Lapčević, Okupac-
ija (Belgrade: Tucović, 1923); etc.
14 Vasil Radoslavov, Dnevni belezhki 1914–1916 (Sofia: Universitetsko izdatelstvo “Sv. 
Kliment Okhridski”, 1993); Petŭr Khr. Petrov, ed., Nauchna ekspeditsia v Makedonia i 
Pomoravieto 1916 (Sofia: Voennoizdatelski kompleks “Sv. Georgi Pobedonosets” and 
Universitetsko izdatelstvo “Sv. Kliment Okhridski”, 1993); Dimitŭr Minchev, Voen-
norevolutsionnata deîinost na Petŭr Dŭrvingov 1898–1918 (Sofia: Voenno izdatelstvo, 
1990).
15 See e.g.: www.firstworldwar.com, www.anamnesis.info, www.archive.org. Balcanica XLIV (2013) 362
responsibility for the war crimes committed in the First World War be ac-
cepted as an excuse; when it comes to invasions, occupations and crimes 
committed by “our own country”, denial or at least revisionism is not a new 
phenomenon; unfortunately, it appears that we can consider it as being “ac-
cepted” or “normal practice” in about every European national historiogra-
phy. Exceptions are very rare indeed.
Leaving these considerations aside, this short paper will try to give 
a picture of the main elements of Bulgarian crimes against civilians perpe-
trated in the Kingdom of Serbia during the First World War, suggesting a 
different approach to the one used so far. We hope that this small contri-
bution will be considered as a point of departure for opening new fields of 
discussion and study; we also hope that it could provide an opportunity for 
Serbian and other European historians to begin to build together a way to 
future research. 
The significance of Bulgarian policy against civilians during the First World 
War
When we speak about crimes against civilians, we first have to try to define 
what that means. At the outbreak of the First World War, international law 
was not adequately equipped to cope with what was about to happen. The 
Peace Conferences held at The Hague in 1899 and 1907 brought about a 
codification of the customs and laws of war, but they only vaguely referred 
to civilians.16 As a matter of fact, there clearly was an appalling lack of sanc-
tions in Article 3 of the Convention of 1907: “A belligerent party which 
violates the provisions of the said Regulation shall, if the case demands, be 
liable to pay compensation. It shall be responsible for all acts committed by 
persons forming part of its armed forces.” However, even if the Kingdom of 
Serbia and the Kingdom of Bulgaria had signed the convention, it would 
not have had importance in the relations between European states. So when 
the First World War broke out there were practically no firm regulations 
that could hope to prevent potential crimes; and the extermination, mass 
rape, torture and destruction that took place in Belgium, northern France 
and Serbia in 1914 demonstrated the meaning of it. In 1914, but in 1915 
as well, virtually every government published a “coloured” book denouncing 
16 E.g. Art. 25 of the Convention of 1907: “The attack or bombardment, by whatever 
means, of towns, villages, dwellings, or buildings which are undefended is prohibited”; 
Art. 28: “The pillage of a town or place, even when taken by assault, is prohibited”; 
Art. 46: “Family honour and rights, the lives of persons, and private property, as well as 
religious convictions and practice, must be respected. Private property cannot be confis-
cated”; Art. 47: “Pillage is formally forbidden”, etc.M. Pisarri, Bulgarian Crimes against Civilians in Occupied Serbia 363
enemy crimes,17 but in the context of war it did not produce any change in 
international warfare.
On 24 May 1915, for the first time in history, the members of the 
Entente coalition condemned the Ottoman policy of extermination against 
the Armenians by defining it as a “crime against humanity”, and placed the 
responsibility on the Ottoman government;18 but there were no other con-
sequences. It was only at the end of the war that the victorious states began 
to work on new legislation in order to define crimes never seen before and 
to punish those responsible for them. At the Peace Conference in Paris, 
the Commission on the Responsibility of the Authors of the War and on 
Enforcement of Penalties was instituted. On 29 March 1919, after intensive 
work, it presented the first report, codifying thirty-two classes of crimes 
against the laws of war and humanity, including massacres, rapes, deporta-
tions and internments, tortures and deliberate starvation, forced labour and 
systematic terrorism.19 It was supposed to be the legal basis to start from in 
prosecuting those responsible, who had already been individually identified 
by the inter-allied and national commissions. Nothing was done, however, 
and in the treaties with Central powers and their allies the question was 
practically ignored, delegating jurisdiction over war criminals to their re-
spective national courts. The result was that out of 20,000 German individ-
uals listed by all victorious nations, only seventeen were tried and only ten of 
these were sentenced to prison from six months to five years maximum; in 
Austria, out of 484 individuals, only two were tried and both were acquitted; 
in Turkey not a single person was punished for the Armenian genocide.20 
None of the 500 individuals from Bulgaria that the Kingdom of Serbia 
(the post-war Kingdom of SCS) held responsible for the crimes committed 
against its civilians during the war was sentenced.
This allowed the Bulgarians to hold on to the stance of denying any 
crimes – expressed during the Peace Conference21 – and, in the long run, 
17 Deuxième livre gris belge (Paris–Nancy: Librairie militaire Berger-Levrault, 1916); 
Deuxième livre bleu serbe (Paris–Nancy: Librairie militaire Berger-Levrault, 1916); Livre 
jaune francais (Paris–Nancy: Librairie militaire Berger-Levrault, 1916), etc.
18 Bruna Bianchi, I civili: vittime innocenti o bersagli legittimi?, in Bianchi, ed., La vio-
lenza contro la popolazione civile, 73; Vahkan Dadrian, Storia del genocidio armeno. Con-
flitti nazionali dai Balcani al Caucaso (Milan: Guerini e Associati, 2003), 245.
19 Arhiv Jugoslavije [Archives of Yugoslavia; hereafter AJ], Delegation of the Kingdom 
of SCS to the Peace Conference in Paris (336), 62, doc. 7760, Rapport présenté à la 
Conférence des préliminaires de paix par la Commission des responsabilités des auteurs de la 
guerre et sanctions, 15.
20 Bianchi, ed., La violenza contro la popolazione civile, 77.
21 Statement by the Bulgarian Peace Delegation on Alleged Bulgarian Atrocities in Serbia, 
1919 (www.firstworldwar.com).Balcanica XLIV (2013) 364
prevented every possibility of investigation into, discussion about or admis-
sion of criminal politics during the First World War; no evidence remained 
in public memory or made its way into historiography; the crimes were sim-
ply forgotten. Previous statements of Bulgarian authorities – which seemed 
to admit the responsibility of some Bulgarian officers (not of the govern-
ment, or the army), after which three of them were arrested and the other 
two executed – could be dismissed without consequences.22
For this reason, when talking about the Bulgarian crimes in the King-
dom of Serbia between 1915 and 1918, we have to begin from the findings 
of the Inter-Allied Commission’s inquiry and the Commission of Respon-
sibilities’ classification of the Bulgarian crimes into thirty-two violations, 
because this is the most important and reliable definition of crimes.
We have to focus on two elements. In its conclusions, the Report 
submitted by the Inter-Allied Commission stated: “We can affirm that 
there is not a single article of the Convention of The Hague or principle 
of international law that the Bulgarians did not violate”;23 while the Com-
mission of Responsibilities affirmed: “The war has been conducted by the 
Central Empires and their allies, Turkey and Bulgaria, with barbarian and 
illegitimate methods, in violation of the laws and customs of war and el-
ementary principles of humanity.”24 In this second case, it is evident that 
Serbian (and Greek) civilians figured as those who had suffered like no 
other excluding the Armenians; Bulgarian authorities were responsible for 
at least eighteen types of violation of the laws of war against Serbian civil-
ians, who were victims of the worst of the codified crimes. In some cases, as 
22 Rapport, vol. I, doc. 89, 302–303, Bulgarian Minister of Foreign Affairs Teodorov’s 
response to General Chrétien, 27 December 1918, saying that the Bulgarian govern-
ment had set up a commission to enquire into Serbian allegations of crimes perpetrated 
against Serbian priests, and that five perpetrators had already been identified: Maj. Ilkov, 
Lt Popov and Lt Simeonov had been arrested, while Col. Kalkandzhiev and Lt Yurkov 
were already dead. See also Statement by the Bulgarian Peace Delegation, according to 
which: “The principal offenders, such as Major Ilkoff, Colonel Kalkandijeff, who are 
mentioned by the Commission of Enquiry, Colonel Airanoff, Colonel Popoff and oth-
ers responsible for the crimes perpetrated, are already in the hands of justice which will 
soon pronounce on the misdeeds which are imputed to them. Major Kultchin […] has 
been sentenced to death and executed in Sophia.” And finally, AJ, 336-23-1264, Serbian 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs to Serbian Delegation in Paris, 9/22 April 1919, said that 
Captain Samardzhiev, commander of the Gorne Pancharevo camp, had initially been 
sentenced to death and then to fifteen years in prison.
23 Rapport, vol. I, 34.
24 Rapport présenté à la Conference, 15.M. Pisarri, Bulgarian Crimes against Civilians in Occupied Serbia 365
in that of “attempts at denationalization of the population”, they figured as 
the only victims and the Bulgarians as the only perpetrators.25
Starting from these elements we can grasp the importance of the 
question of Bulgarian crimes in the Kingdom of Serbia during the First 
World War: a historical moment in which civilians, mostly Serbs, were the 
target of the occupying forces not only as a result of war operations, but also 
because of a political plan of Bulgarian authorities.
The Balkan Wars: crimes against civilians
Before analyzing what happened in 1915–1918 we should try to understand 
what lay at the roots of these events; in this sense, we cannot begin to dis-
cuss Bulgarian crimes against civilians in the Kingdom of Serbia without 
considering the historical events that preceded them. And to understand 
it, it is crucial to take into consideration the sufferings of civilians during 
the Balkan Wars, not only Serbian, but also Turkish, Albanian, Bulgarian, 
Greek and Slavic population of Macedonia.26
The Balkan Wars of 1912 (between Balkan states and the Ottoman 
Empire) and especially of 1913 (between Balkan states) were a clash be-
tween Balkan states never seen before and, even if it was not the first time 
that they fought against each other, this conflict may be said to have been a 
major turning point in their relations: because it was for the first time that 
nationalism, the ideology of which had come from western Europe not 
much earlier, carried by single political classes, became the fundamental 
generator of aggression and destruction.
The First Balkan War broke out in October 1912 and after a few 
months the Ottoman Empire was driven out of the Balkan Peninsula; the 
allied Balkan states (Bulgaria, Serbia, Greece and Montenegro) expanded 
their territories and won a new status not only regionally, but also on a Eu-
ropean scale. However, the change was more complicated, more drastic and 
went far beyond political borders.
The demise of Ottoman power meant the collapse of not only the 
political (institutional) or military system, but also of the existing social and 
economic structures. It was a collapse of the whole region: and as the armies 
of the Balkan allies marched into new territories, especially Vardar Macedo-
nia, they were not everywhere acclaimed as “liberators”.
25 Ibid. 41.
26 We do not use here the term “Macedonian” in a national and ethnic sense because 
of as yet unfirm national consciousness of the Slavic population of Macedonia in that 
period.Balcanica XLIV (2013) 366
While the political elites in Belgrade, Sofia and Athens saw it as 
liberation from the Ottoman yoke, for the ethnic Turkish and generally 
Muslim population it meant violence, looting and massacre.27
According to varyingly reliable sources, Bulgarian regular troops and 
comitadjis, armed bands of the pro-Bulgarian revolutionary organization in 
Macedonia (IMRO), drove out Turks of the Tikveš region and destroyed 
Turkish villages around Kavala, Serres and Drama;28 Serbian regular troops 
and chetnik units burned down Albanian villages between Kumanovo and 
Skopje;29 and Greek regular troops and bands of andartes, did the same 
around Thessaloniki.30
Civilian suffering was particularly great during the sieges of the towns 
where Ottoman garrisons were still resisting. Diseases, starvation and bom-
bardments caused the death of thousands of people in Adrianople, Scutari 
(Shkoder) and Ioannina, and once the Christian troops entered the towns 
civilians were often victims of pillaging and violence.31
Muslim civilians were without doubt the main victim of these Chris-
tian armies: there was, of course, resentment and revenge of local Christian 
population for the crimes committed by Turks during the suppression of 
Gorna Dzhumaia (1902) and Ilinden (1903) uprisings. It seemed, however, 
that regular armies wanted to drive the Turkish population out of the region: 
this was the conclusion drawn by the members of the Carnegie Commis-
sion, an independent committee investigating the causes of the war and the 
conduct of the belligerent parties, but also by other foreign observers, such 
as Leon Trotsky, correspondent for the Kyevskaia Mysl at the time, who 
described, from the second-hand information he obtained from his hotel in 
27 Report of the International Commission to Inquire into the Causes and Conduct of the 
Balkan Wars (Washington: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1914), 71–72 
and 76.
28 Arhiv Srbije [Archives of Serbia; hereafter AS], Ministarstvo inostranih dela, Političko 
odeljenje [Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Political Section; hereafter MID-PO], 1913, 
XVIII/262, confid. no. 20, Consulate of the Kingdom of Serbia in Salonika to Ministry 
of Foreign Affairs, 10/23 April 1913.
29 Leon Trotsky, The Balkan Wars 1912–1913 (New York–Sydney: Anchor Foundation, 
1980), 267.
30 Report of the International Commission, 72.
31 Ibid. 113–114 and 326. On the siege of Scutari see also Gino Berri, L’assedio di 
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Belgrade, what the Bulgarians and Serbs allegedly did as “systematic exter-
mination of the Muslim population in villages, towns, and districts”.32
A result of the war atrocities, but also of the new situation where 
Muslims no longer had the position of dominance in Balkan communities, 
was an exodus to the Ottoman Empire which involved probably hundreds 
of thousands of civilians. Two years after the war, Serbian authorities re-
corded that, between October 1912 and March 1914, 289,807 Muslims 
(not counting children under the age of six) passed through Salonika on 
their way to Turkey.33
While the migrations of Muslims were still going on, the Christians 
in Macedonia and Thrace became new victims of the extreme nationalisms 
of the allied states that had defeated the Ottoman power. This took place in 
June 1913, when Bulgaria made a desperate attempt to annex the territories 
that Serbia had liberated a year before.
In the Second Balkan War (1913), conflict between Serbian and 
Greek policies on one side and Bulgarian on the other exploded in the 
worst way. Propaganda campaigns whose aim was to demonstrate that the 
population of Macedonia were either ethnic Serbs or Greeks or Bulgarians, 
and which had already had some conflicting moments in the recent past 
– the establishing of the Bulgarian Exarchate (1870), the treaties of San 
Stefano and Berlin (1878), but also rivalries through the construction of 
churches and schools in Macedonia, and through paramilitary formations 
such as Serbian chetniks, Bulgarian comitadjis and Greek andartes – now 
turned into a war with the intention of eliminating the enemy and national-
izing occupied territories. Aegean Macedonia was the main theatre of the 
Bulgarian-Greek clash; in Doxato, Bulgarians were responsible for massa-
cres of Greeks, while Bulgarians were victims near Serres.34
Civilians were targeted and they took part in the conflict probably to 
defend themselves or to take revenge. It was not merely an “atavistic hate”, 
but the policy of the belligerent parties. This was also the conclusion of the 
Carnegie Commission which, relying on Bulgarian sources, recorded the 
destruction of 160 Bulgarian villages and 16,000 homes in the area between 
Kilkis (Kukush) and the Bulgarian border, an “ethnic cleansing” of Bulgar-
ians and a quick (and traumatic) colonization by the Greeks driven out of 
other parts of Macedonia.35 Bulgarian civilians were a target of the Ottoman 
32 Trotsky, Balkan Wars, 286.
33 AS, MID-PO, 1914, confid. no. 58, doc. 0587, Consulate of the Kingdom of Serbia 
in Salonika to Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 30 March/12 April 1914.
34 Report of the International Commission, 79 and 82–83 (on the Doxato massacre); and 
89–92 (on the Serres massacre).
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recapture of Thrace; it was estimated that in just a few days of July 1913, 
46,000 Bulgarians fled the region before the ravaging Ottoman army.36
Crimes were perpetrated in Vardar Macedonia as well. The Muslims 
who had left the region because of Bulgarian atrocities now returned with 
the  Serbian  regular  army  and  paramilitary  units  (bashi-bazouks). Their 
target was the Bulgarian and pro-Bulgarian population (“Exarchists”) of 
Kratovo and its environs, Radoviš and the Tikveš region. According to the 
not always reliable Report of the International Commission of the Carn-
egie Foundation, Serbian authorities not only knew what was going on, but 
were directly responsible for it;37 as a result, thousands of civilians left their 
homes and fled to Bulgaria.
Crimes against civilians were committed not only in Macedonia and 
Thrace, but in Eastern Serbia, too. It was the regular Bulgarian army that 
was responsible for the destruction, looting and killing in Knjaževac and 
the surrounding villages. The International Commission which investigated 
these crimes recorded a large number of rapes and, for the first time in 
history, paid particular attention to this kind of violence – rape was no lon-
ger seen as a “normal” attendant of every war but as a systematic cruelty 
against women38 or, in other words, as a crime. The French journalist Henry 
Barby said that what he had seen in Eastern Serbia was more horrifying 
than what the Bulgarians did in Macedonia, and it seemed that the goal of 
General Kutinchev’s army was to ravage and pillage the region, like “Tatar 
hordes”.39
Crimes did not stop after the Bulgarian retreat. According to the 
International Commission, it was now Serbian troops which, entering Bul-
garia, devastated many villages around Vidin and Belogradchik, burning 
homes and killing civilians.40
During the Second Balkan War, which ended in Bulgarian defeat, 
violent crimes were committed on all fronts from Adrianople to Saloni-
ka, Eastern Macedonia and Eastern Serbia; it all happened in one month, 
which is how long the war lasted, in a way that made experts of the Carn-
36 B. Ratković, M. Djurišić & S. Skoko, Srbija i Crna Gora u Balkanskim ratovima 1912–
1913 (Beograd: BIGZ, 1972), 315–316.
37 Report of the International Commission, 145–146 and 368–372; Henry Barby, Bregal-
nica (Belgrade: Štamparija Savić i komp., 1914), 103 [transl. from French: Bregalnitsa 
(Paris: Bernard Grasset, 1914)]; Z. Todorovski & Zh. Buzhashka, eds., K. P. Misirkov, 
Dnevnik 5. VII – 30. VIII 1913 g. (Skopje: Državen arhiv na Republika Makedonija & 
Sofia: “Arkhivi”, 2008), 60.
38 Report of the International Commission, 137; Barby, Bregalnica, 156–158.
39 Barby, Bregalnica, 155.
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egie Commission, dependent on local sources and interpretations, mostly 
Bulgarian, think that “ethnic cleansing” had been planned and organized 
before the war.
The Treaty of Bucharest signed on 10 August 1913 caused Bulgaria’s 
frustration not only because it did not gain Serbian Macedonia but because 
it lost the territory it had gained in the First Balkan War: it had to cede 
Aegean Macedonia to Greece, Vardar Macedonia to Serbia, eastern Thrace 
to the Ottoman Empire, and southern Dobruja, Bulgarian since the Treaty 
of Berlin in 1878, to Romania.
Results of those treaties had not only political or economic aspects; 
it should be noted that probably the most significant aspect of the Treaty of 
Bucharest (and the Treaty of London with the Ottoman Empire signed on 
29 September 1913) was that in most cases it confirmed territorial gains, 
purportedly obtained by ethnic cleansing of entire regions, and consoli-
dated nationalist politics that the Balkan states pursued since the victory 
over the Ottomans in order to nationalize newly-annexed territories. First 
objectives of the Greek and Serbian nationalizing process were the Bul-
garian Church and schools in Macedonia, which were the most important 
institutions keeping portions of the Christian inhabitants of Macedonia 
strictly tied to Bulgaria. The Bulgarian Orthodox Church (Exarchate) had 
been created by a Sultan’s decree of 1870 and, along with the Ecumenical 
Patriarchate in Constantinople, was the main Christian ecclesiastical insti-
tution in Macedonia. The Exarchate had autonomy and the right to appoint 
bishops in Bulgaria, Macedonia, Thrace and Southern Serbia (until 1878), 
using its powers to pursue the Bulgarization of the non-Bulgarian Slavic 
population. 
During the nationalizing process after the 1913 war, according to 
the information supplied to the International Commission from Bulgarian 
sources, teachers were forced to declare themselves as Serbian (or Greek) or 
were arrested; comitadjis, who often enjoyed heroic reputation among the 
Bulgarian civilian population, were also arrested and treated like bandits 
and vagabonds; members of the Bulgarian clergy were forced to leave or 
to accept the Serbian Church, and sometimes they were beaten by Serbian 
soldiers.41 The Serbian secret organization Black Hand (Crna ruka) was al-
leged to resort to kidnapping or killing representatives of Bulgarian intel-
ligentsia and those showing pro-Bulgarian sentiments in public.42
In this way people were forced to accept Serbian religious and cul-
tural authorities, they could no longer enjoy the rights equal to those of the 
inhabitants of pre-war Serbia and their regions were under direct military 
41 Ibid. 51–52 and 165–168.
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control and not under civilian administration. The law on annexation issued 
by King Peter of Serbia in late December 1913 confirmed this situation – as 
had been the case in previously acquired territories in Serbia: that new ter-
ritories were not immediately integrated as equal in rights to the other re-
gions of pre-war Serbia, but were given a special status, governed by special 
laws and marked by a slow implementation of the constitution.43
Discontent among Christian civilian population, especially in the 
Bitolj (Monastir) area, grew fast, and shortly before the First World War 
Serbian authorities registered the danger of potential unrest. The situation 
was described by the Ministry of War itself:
[...] People of Debar, Ohrid and Bitolj are embittered because the Serbian 
State does not allow them to have their schools in Bulgarian language or 
their church and priests; others are still more embittered and they say that 
Serbs have introduced a worse regime than the Turkish was, forcing them 
to become Serbs, to build streets and to labour.44
Between the Balkan Wars and the invasion of Serbia in 1915
This critical situation in the new region became drastically complicated 
with the outbreak of the First World War. The burden of war had to be car-
ried by men of pre-1912 Serbia, because non-Serbian recruits from Serbian 
Macedonia, Old Serbia (Kosovo and the former Sandjak of Novi Bazar) 
were not reliable enough or willing to fight in the name of King Peter, 
while the authorities became more suspicious, confronted with potential 
disorder in the Albanian-inhabited and, especially, pro-Bulgarian areas of 
the New Territories (Nove Oblasti). And while in the event of localized 
revolts in Kosovo and in Western Macedonia, where Albanian population 
formed an absolute majority, Austria-Hungary would interfere in order to 
compel Serbia to send troops, causing the weakening of the front at the 
same time, the situation among the Bulgarian and pro-Bulgarian elements 
in Serbian Macedonia was far more dangerous because of their number and 
their determination to reject Serbian authorities and to join Bulgaria. Bel-
grade did not only fear potential revolts, but also guerrilla (comitadji) incur-
sions from Bulgaria and especially an intervention of the Bulgarian army, 
which would be fatal for the outcome of the war. And this was not merely 
a possibility, because both Belgrade and Sofia were aware that the “Mace-
donian question” was still open. In 1913 all major Bulgarian authorities had 
43 Stenografske beleške Narodne skupštine [Records of the National Assembly Pro-
ceedings], 14/12/1913, 506–512.
44 AS, MID-PO, 1914, confid. no. 1039, doc. 0610, Ministry of War to Ministry of 
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already openly announced a new war against Serbia: King Ferdinand, who 
addressed his troops and told them to “fly the flag for happier days”, Prime 
Minister Radoslavov, who addressed diplomats in Sofia saying that revenge 
was Bulgaria’s long-term objective,45 and General Savov, who admitted that 
Bulgaria had to prepare itself to take revenge on Serbia and Greece.46
And once the Great War broke out, the revenge was only a matter of 
time. Bulgaria maintained neutrality until the summer of 1915, but both the 
Triple Entente and the Triple Alliance endeavoured to sway the Radoslavov 
government to join the war on their side; in all negotiations conducted by 
Radoslavov, Serbian Macedonia featured as the sine qua non for Bulgar-
ia’s entry into the war. In order to justify it, in late 1914 and during 1915 
the Bulgarian press focused on the situation of the “Bulgarian brothers in 
Macedonia” under Serbian rule, reported on every case of mass desertion of 
Macedonians from the Serbian army and described alleged atrocities that 
Serbian authorities were committing against civilians in all parts of Mace-
donia. The scale, frequency and types of the crimes described in this propa-
ganda press campaign created the impression that the non-Serbian civilian 
population in Macedonia were really in danger of being exterminated unless 
Bulgaria intervened to save them. The intention of such intensive propa-
ganda was to win over Bulgarian public opinion which otherwise would 
not have been ready for another war, especially considering the fact that the 
legacy of the Balkan Wars was not only a moral and national defeat, but 
hundreds of thousands of human lives, economic disaster and starvation.
As reported by the Serbian consul in Sofia, by the middle of Decem-
ber 1914 and the beginning of February 1915, at least eighteen such articles 
appeared in Bulgarian newspapers,47 alleging of massacres of Macedonian 
conscripts in the Serbian army, destructions, mass rapes and ethnic cleans-
ings.48 Gory details soon became more interesting than general accounts, 
especially when they involved children, priests and women, or any kind of 
torture;49 lists of missing or killed civilians were often published too, as well 
45 Richard Crampton, Bulgaria 1878–1918. A History (New York: Columbia University 
Press, 1983), 425.
46 Barby, Bregalnica, 194.
47 AS, MID-PO, 1915, X/213, list of articles in the Bulgarian press.
48 AS, MID-PO, 1915, X/242, Kambana, 22 December 1914/4 January 1915; X/255, 
Utro, 25 December 1914/7 January 1915; X/245, Dnevnik, 13/26 January 1915.
49 AS, MID-PO, 1915, X/275, Narodni prava, no. 59, 14/27 March 1915; X/279, Nar-
odni prava, no. 62, 18/31 March 1915; Dnevnik, 18/31 March 1915.Balcanica XLIV (2013) 372
as stories of alleged massacres in all parts of Macedonia: Skopje, Bitola, 
Prilep, Ohrid, Veles, Štip, Radoviš and so on.50
At the same time Bulgarian comitadjis undertook new actions to cut 
off communications between Serbia and the port of Salonika, the Serbian 
army’s most important supply line. The crucial action took place on 3 April 
1915, when about one thousand well-armed comitadjis from the town of 
Strumica in Bulgaria attacked the Valandovo railway station in order to cut 
the railway and telegraph lines: many of about 200 Serbian soldiers killed 
died in combat, but many were murdered after they surrendered; the comi-
tadjis tortured them to death or burned them alive, according to the report 
of an international commission composed of medical personnel of allied 
sanitary missions in Macedonia set up in the days following the attack.51
This incident made it plain to the Serbian government that its Mace-
donian border with Bulgaria required more attention, but a mass transfer 
of troops from the zone of battle with Austria-Hungary was impossible 
despite a temporary quiet on the front: in the event of a Bulgarian attack, 
Serbia would not be able to defend herself.
At the end of the summer this possibility became reality. According 
to the agreement between Bulgaria and the Central Powers signed on 6 
September, in return for joining the immediate attack on Serbia, Bulgaria 
was to gain the whole of Serbian Macedonia but also – as Radoslavov in-
sisted – eastern and southern Serbia, in addition to territories in Dobruja, 
Aegean Macedonia and eastern Thrace lost after the defeat of 1913 (in the 
event that Romania and Greece should join the Entente). On 6 October 
German and Austro-Hungarian troops under the command of German 
General Von Mackensen launched invasion from the north, and five days 
later Bulgarian troops crossed the border into Serbia, while King Ferdi-
50 AS, MID-PO, 1915, X/291, Narodni prava, no. 63, 19 March/1 April 1915; X/319, 
Narodni Prava, n. 64, 20 March/2 April 1915; X/323, Volja, no. 645, 21 March/3 April 
1915; X/337, Utro, no. 1497, 29 March/11 April 1915; X/347, Narodni prava, 29 
March/11 April 1915; X/362, Utro, no. 1500, 1/14 April 1915; X/374, Narodni prava, 
no. 73, 3/16 April 1915; X/411, Narodni Prava, no. 77, 7/20 April 1915; etc.
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Bitola to Ministry of Interior, 29 March/11 April 1915; AS, MID-PO, 1915, XV/188, 
confid. no. 11973, Commander Djordjević and Major Blažarić to Ministry of War, 26 
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nand’s speech encouraged his soldiers to free their brothers in Macedonia 
from the Serbian regime and enslavement.52
This time the Serbian army, fighting on two fronts against superior 
enemy forces, was not able to resist on its own, and the government and 
High Command ordered its withdrawal towards the Adriatic across Alba-
nia. During this terrible march over the snow-laden mountains – known 
as the “Serbian Golgotha” – more than a hundred thousand soldiers lost 
their lives to harsh winter, starvation, disease and attacks by hostile Alba-
nian tribes; while more than four million civilians found themselves under 
enemy occupation.
Bulgarian crimes in occupied Serbia during the First World War: the beginning
In less than one month enemy armies took control over the entire King-
dom of Serbia. As set by the agreement of 6 September, Bulgaria gained 
the whole of Macedonia and Eastern and Southern Serbia, from the river 
Danube on the north to the region of Kosovo in the south, establishing a 
new border with Austria-Hungary that ran along the river Morava to the 
village of Stalać and then between the Južna (South) and Zapadna (West) 
Morava rivers, the region of Skopska Crna Gora and Šar Planina mountain. 
Austro-Hungary took the rest of Serbia, while Germany only established a 
number of check-points to control the railway and other communications 
with the port of Salonika. 
Bulgaria soon divided her new territories in two administrative enti-
ties, each administered by a military commander: the “Military Inspection 
Area of Macedonia”, whose commandant was General Petrov, and the “Mil-
itary Inspection Area of Morava” (including Eastern and Southern Serbia), 
where the first commandant was General Kutinchev (the same who had led 
the Bulgarian invasion of Eastern Serbia in 1913).
In Serbian Macedonia they settled without evident problems or hos-
tilities; nevertheless this did not prevent them from committing crimes 
against Serbian prisoners of war and civilians. The key to understanding 
what happened there at the end of 1915, when Bulgaria finally fulfilled her 
territorial ambitions concerning that region, should  be sought in the sym-
biosis between Bulgarian authorities (political and military) and the IMRO 
with its comitadjis.
Colonel Aleksandar Protogerov, commander of the 3rd Brigade of 
the 11th “Macedonia” Division, together with his comrade Todor Alek-
sandrov, took control of the region of Štip in Eastern Macedonia. At the 
52 See the speech delivered by King Ferdinand on 11 October 1915, in Radoslavov, 
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end of October he ordered extermination of 120 wounded and sick Serbian 
prisoners of war from the town hospital: they were killed in a village near 
Štip by both units of 11th Division and comitadjis under the command of 
voyvoda Ivan Yanev Bŭrlev.53
Similar killings took place in other parts of Macedonia, such as the 
village of Resan, where Bulgarian regular troops massacred 28; the town of 
Kruševo, where comitadjis cut throat to 13, or Topolčani near Bitola, where 
regular units slaughtered 30 Serbian soldiers;54 and in Kosovo, for example 
near Priština, where Bulgarian cavalry troops killed 500 Serbian prisoners, 
or on the banks of the Drim, where 195 were killed and their bodies thrown 
into the river.55 Crimes were committed in many other places.
It was a war, someone might say; and, remembering the experience 
from the Balkan Wars, we may claim that what Bulgarian regular troops and 
comitadjis did to Serbian prisoners was probably an act of revenge or some-
thing “normal” in times of war. But some important factors tell us that the 
reality was not that simple: first of all, the Bulgarian soldiers interrogated by 
the Swiss criminologist R. A. Reiss admitted that they had received specific 
orders from their superior officers to kill Serbian prisoners,56 and – this may 
be crucial – not only soldiers but also civilians were the target of massacres. 
Here we can clearly see that at the moment of invasion the intention to 
eradicate every aspect of Serbian influence in the region, primarily by killing 
the Serbian and pro-Serbian elements, had already existed as a precise plan 
in the Bulgarian army and comitadji bands.
Regular troops took control of the region, but comitadjis were ap-
pointed mayors and prefects, and they retained control of the whole po-
lice structure.57 Every major town was controlled by a comitadji leader 
53 Rapport, vol. II, docs. 135–143, 266–284 and 286–303; AJ, MIP-DU, 334-20, testi-
monies of Sadedin Kerimović and Dr. A. de Mendoza.
54 On the Resan massacre see Rapport, vol. II, doc. 151, 307; AJ, MIP-DU, 334-19, 
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VA], p. 6, k. 609, 35/3, cable on the testimony of Stanoje Stanojević, and VA, p. 3a, f. 3, 
11/1.
55 R. A. Reiss, Zverstva Bugara i Austro-Nemaca. Bugarska zverstva u toku rata (Thes-
saloniki: Državna štamparija Kraljevine Srbije, 1916), reproduced in Sladjana Bojković 
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radovi (Belgrade: Istorijski muzej Srbije, 1997); R. A. Reiss, Les infractions aux lois et 
conventions de la guerre commises par les ennemis de la Serbie depuis la retraite serbe de 1915 
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(voyvoda),58 whose power became absolute and legitimized through a new 
administrative system in Macedonia; they operated strictly in order to elim-
inate Serbian presence in their territories. It was not a difficult task, because 
in the towns – like in most of Serbian Macedonia – the Slavic population 
was not entirely Serbian or pro-Serbian, and this meant that comitadjis in 
the towns had to eliminate the Serbian administrative structure – if still 
there, because most officials had withdrawn with the army to Albania or to 
Greece – composed predominantly of Serbs from pre-Balkan wars Serbia 
who had the duty to pursue and oversee the Serbianization of the region 
(teachers, priests, officials, etc.) – and all elements who collaborated with 
them.
For the same reason destructions and mass murders took place in many 
villages where the population was Serbian or loyal to Serbian authorities,59 
concentrated in the area between Veles, Prilep and Brod (region of Poreče). 
The destructions looked like punitive expeditions against previously defined 
targets, where Bulgarian regular troops and comitadjis arrived with the clear 
intention (and probably orders or, if not, at least freedom of action) to de-
stroy and kill.
On 14 November Bulgarian units of the 7th “Rila” Division and Turks 
of the village of Crnilište entered the villages of Dolgovac and Kostinci near 
Prilep. Together they pillaged houses and slaughtered people who were still 
inside or who tried to escape, including children and women, at least more 
than 70 of them;60 then they gathered the remaining 200 Serb civilians in 
the place called “Samakovo” and slaughtered them with no mercy, “rushing 
with their bloody knives from person to person”.61 The same happened in 
the village of Bogomila near Veles, where all Serb inhabitants where mas-
sacred and their homes destroyed; women were raped and tortured before 
they were killed.62 Massacres were committed in many other places in that 
Macedonian area, as R. A. Reiss reported from one of his sources:
In the village of Bogomil they killed 95 persons, of whom just 20 were 
men and the others were children and women; […] in the village of Go-
stirachna 65 persons, of whom 10 men and the rest women and children; 
58 Rapport, vol. I, 9.
59 Ibid. 8.
60 AJ, MIP-DU, 334-19, testimony of Vaska Petrović (partially published in Rapport, vol. 
III, doc. 296, 189–190); AJ, MIP-DU, 334-19, testimony of Nane Serafimović (partially 
published in Rapport, vol. III, doc. 306, 196–197); AJ, MIP-DU, 334-19, testimony of 
Petar Mijailović (partially published in Rapport, vol. III, doc. 354, 256).
61 AJ, MIP-DU, 334-19, testimony of Stojanka Stojkov.
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in Strovie 80 persons, of whom only 15 were men […]; in Dolgavatz 280 
persons, of whom 20 men older than 50 years and all the rest women and 
children; in Kostentzi 60 persons, of whom only 8 men; in Brod […], on 
the 12th/25th of December 1915, 105 persons were killed […] and the day 
later other 100 on the way to Dobrech; in Stounje, 18 persons.63
It was calculated that in the early period of occupation more than 
2,000 Serb civilians were killed by Bulgarian regular troops and comitadjis 
in the area between Veles, Prilep and Brod alone, and that tens of Serb-in-
habited villages were razed to the ground;64 but many other civilians shared 
the same fate, especially in the towns, which were the target of the “cleans-
ing” of the Serbian element by the comitadjis.
However, murder was not the only method of ethnic cleansing that 
the Bulgarians used in Serbian Macedonia. Not all Serbian notables were 
killed, especially in the towns where they accounted for a significant part of 
the community: they were sent to concentration camps in pre-war Bulgaria. 
It seems that at first there were no camps intended for civilians only, but 
that they were interned together with prisoners of war; but the fact that de-
portations began as early as the end of 1915 (one of the first trains left the 
Skopje railway station on 1 January 1916) suggests that the idea of deporta-
tion of civilians had been conceived before Bulgaria’s entry into the war and 
that its implementation started as soon as the Bulgarians organized their 
administration in the region.65 We can also notice that deportations became 
massive as early as January 1916: on 24 January a convoy of 500 civilians 
from the districts of Prilep,66 Veles and Brod arrived in Sofia, while at the 
same time all teachers, priests, officials and all suspicious persons from pre-
Balkan wars Serbia who lived in Eastern Macedonia were deported and 
considered prisoners of war on the order issued by the Ministry of War.67
Compared  to  the  systematic  terror  that  the  Bulgarian  army  was 
spreading in Eastern and Southern Serbia, that is to say in the other admin-
istrative unit created by Bulgaria (the Military Inspection Area “Morava”), 
the crimes happening in Serbian Macedonia were more of a local character. 
There were some fundamental differences between the situations in Mace-
63 Reiss, Les infractions, 20–21.
64 Ibid. 
65 Rapport, vol. I, doc. 13, 29–30.
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donia and Morava at the moment of invasion, and Bulgarian authorities 
were certainly aware of them. At the time, Macedonia was inhabited by var-
ious ethnic groups, including non-Slavic Albanians, Vlachs, Greeks, Jews, 
Roma and Turks; however, the two main groups of the Slavic population 
were Serbs and Bulgarians, followed by a third Slavic element with fluc-
tuating national consciousness, though in many cases, especially in eastern 
parts of Serbian Macedonia, people felt themselves closer to Bulgarian than 
to Serbian culture, religion and language. This was not the case in Morava, 
where most people felt themselves as Serbs and whose men were fighting 
against Bulgaria. There were no comitadji bands in Morava, nor was there a 
significant recent past that could justify any ethnic claim by the Bulgarian 
side. Morava was a part of the Kingdom of Serbia, and for this reason it was 
the object of a cruel policy whose aim was to transform this region into a 
part of the Kingdom of Bulgaria; in Morava, attempts at Bulgarization can 
be noticed much better and more clearly than in Macedonia. At the same 
time we can notice planning behind this process or, in other words, the 
responsibility of the Bulgarian government and King Ferdinand, as well as 
the army, for the extermination of the Serbian nation and culture in that 
region.
Before the invasion of Morava, Colonel Popov, chief of staff of the 
6th “Bdin” Division, distributed to the officers a confidential statement con-
taining the order to kill, once the division arrived in Serbia, all persons that 
might have an influence on the common people: first of all priests, teachers, 
professors and officials.68 Before the Bulgarian attack, in some places (e.g. 
Vranje) pro-Bulgarian elements had prepared lists of the most prominent 
local Serbs,69 and as soon as Bulgarian troops entered the region their intel-
ligence recorded all potential enemies, such as journalists, members of agri-
cultural organizations, members of political parties, elected officials, etc.70
Actions took places immediately. On 20 November 1915 all teachers, 
priests and officials of the city of Niš (the seat of the Military Inspection 
Area) were summoned by the commander of the city Azmanov in order 
to be given the papers allowing free movement, but they were all arrested. 
Four days later they were sent, together with some prisoners of war, on foot 
to Sofia; at the same time 21 priests were killed in the village of Kremenica 
near Pirot.71
On 14 December General Kutinchev, chief of the Military Inspection 
Area “Morava”, confirmed the already issued order that all former soldiers 
68 Ibid. doc. 6, 16.
69 Hadži-Vasiljević, Bugarska zverstva, 7.
70 Perović, Toplički ustanak, 31.
71 Rapport, vol. II, doc. 166, 340.Balcanica XLIV (2013) 378
of the Serbian army between 18 and 50 years of age, all Serb officers, teach-
ers, clergymen, journalists, former members of Serbian Parliament, former 
military officials and, in general, all suspicious persons from the whole re-
gion should be deported to Old Bulgaria.72
And just like in Macedonia, this plan, too, suggests that it had already 
been decided before the war what was to be done with civilians or, in other 
words, that it had been planned to kill or deport all representatives of Ser-
bian national spirit and to replace them with Bulgarian supporters in order 
to pave the way for the Bulgarization of the region.
Mass deportations started from all major towns of Morava: for ex-
ample, it is known that, after Niš, on 11 December, 300 Serbian men from 
Vranje were imprisoned in Plovdiv,73 while the rest of the male inhabitants 
of this town belonging to the categories specified in Kutinchev’s order were 
deported in late December.74 Civilians were transported to Bulgaria by rail 
or, more often, on foot. In most cases they all had to pass through the town 
of Surdulica, near Vranje, before crossing the border into pre-war Bulgaria. 
And not even this was without a reason: from November 1915 to spring 
1916, when the deportation of notables from Morava ended, Surdulica was 
the scene of the worst crimes in the Kingdom of Serbia since the beginning 
of the war.
A  special  commission  composed  of  Colonel  Kalkadzhiev,  Major 
Ilkov, Second Lieutenant Yurukov and Sergeant Vitanov, all of the 42nd 
Regiment, 3rd Brigade, 1st Division “Sofia”, and Second Lieutenant Si-
monov and Sergeant Erchikov of the 5th Place Regiment,75 was set up in 
the town with the sole duty to select prisoners and decide which from the 
deported groups should be executed immediately. Mass executions of Serbs 
were committed in a nearby place called “Duboka Dolina” and the victims 
were buried in mass graves; we do not know much about how the commis-
sion decided who should be executed, but thanks to Reiss and other re-
searches we know that by the end of April 1916 about 2,000–3,000 civilians 
had been killed in that place.76 For this reason Surdulica was nicknamed the 
“slaughterhouse of Serbs”.77
72 Perović, Toplički ustanak, 27.
73 Rapport, vol. I, doc. 30, report of R. A. Reiss, “La ville de Vrania”, 75.
74 Ibid. 76; Hadži-Vasiljević, Bugarska zverstva, 54-59. 
75 Rapport, vol. II, doc. 115, 75–76; AJ, 334-13, the same document in Serbian in Hadži-
Vasiljević, Bugarska zverstva, 72. The author gives two more names: Dr Peyev and Lt 
Minchev.
76 R. A. Reiss, Surdulica, in Bojković & Pršić, O zločinima, 103.
77 Rapport, vol. I, doc. 41, account of W. Drayton, “Report on Bulgarian atrocities in 
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At the end of the war the Inter-allied Commission in Serbia affirmed 
that the nature of those murders was clearly political, because the Bulgarians 
had wanted to eliminate the Serbian elite in order to deprive the common 
people of their leadership;78 and at the same time to carry out the process 
of Bulgarization, erasing any evidence of Serbian culture in Macedonia and, 
especially, in the Morava region.
The forced introduction of the Bulgarian church and clergy was the 
first step in building a new Bulgarian culture instead of Serbian, because 
ecclesiastic institutions were centres spreading national spirit; in Balkan 
societies they were more powerful than any other cultural or educational 
institution, especially considering that in countries like Serbia more than 
eighty percent of the population were illiterate and lived in the countryside 
often without contact with any other culture except the one promoted by 
the church.
Serbian  language  was  forbidden  everywhere,  schoolteachers  were 
brought from Bulgaria, Serbian books were taken from libraries, schools 
and private collections, and publicly destroyed79 (but the most important 
of them were sent to Bulgaria, along with sacred icons and treasures looted 
from Serbian monasteries and churches).80 It was the other face of Bulgar-
ization, which we can observe through a document sent by the Bulgarian 
Ministry of Education to all authorities in Morava and Macedonia on 26 
February 1916:
[…] Especially in the field of Bulgarian education there is much work to 
be done, because essentially all the material and moral culture we will con-
struct in the new regions, we will establish it through reading and through 
Bulgarian culture, with Bulgarian language and books […]. Ministry of 
Education is already taking the necessary measures to gradually open 
elementary schools wherever possible; then, when the need arises, high 
schools, both normal and specialized, will be opened. The schools will how-
ever be attended only by children and young people, so our adult brothers 
and new fellow citizens who did not receive any education in Bulgarian 
schools, they will stay away from books if we do not provide them access 
to Bulgarian culture. For this reason, at the Ministry of Education a Spe-
78 Ibid. 8.
79 AJ, 334-20, no number, Komisiji za izvidjaj zloupotreba srpskih zarobljenika i in-
terniranih gradjana u Bugarskoj; AJ, 388-8-56 and 57, confid. no. 2098, Inter-allied 
Commission to Serbian Delegation in Paris; AJ, MIP-DU, 334-16, without number, 
account of Bulgarian atrocities in Dojran, 1; the same account in Rapport, vol. III, doc. 
270, 152–155; AJ, MIP-DU, 334-11, testimony of Dimitrije Radivojević.
80 Victor Kuhne, Les Bulgares peints par eux-même, 300–301; see also accounts by the 
Bulgarian ethnographers expedition to Macedonia published in Petrov, ed., Nauchna 
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cial Committee on Education has been established which has the duty to 
supply the new regions with Bulgarian books […]. In communicating the 
above, the Ministry hopes you all will be happy to collaborate in this work, 
taking care to find in your city (or village) a building for local intelligentsia 
to gather so that it should become the centre of Bulgarian education. This 
centre should be called “public reading room”, and it will be under the con-
trol of a local committee […].81
The difficult living conditions imposed by the Bulgarian regime were 
made worse by the extremely violent and corrupt military and civilian struc-
tures. All Reiss’s inquiries – but also all other inquiries, including the Inter-
allied Commission’s report – describe everyday violence perpetrated by Bul-
garians to extort money, goods and food from civilians without any reason 
whatsoever. In some places, such as the town of Vranje, military authorities 
became absolute despots and their actions caused the reaction of the prefect 
who wrote two letters of protest: on 15 February 1916 to Kutinchev82 and on 
5 April to the Interior Ministry.83 In Sofia too, members of the Parliament 
(Sobranie) attacked Radoslavov’s policy in Morava and Macedonia: the So-
cialist leader Blagoev protested against violence and corruption in these 
regions at the session of the Sobranie held on 26 January 1916, and similar 
accusations were later launched by the Democratic leader Malinov.84
People lived in miserable conditions both in Morava and in Mace-
donia. By that time, there already were a large number of former Serbian 
soldiers who were hiding from the Bulgarian army in the mountains, some 
of them organized into chetnik units fighting against the occupying force. 
Bulgarians did not seem to realize how dangerous these two factors could 
be, especially if an opportunity would arise for them to join forces against 
the enemy. This happened in early February 1917, after General Kutinchev 
distributed to the population of Morava the Supreme Command’s mobili-
zation orders for all men between 18 and 45 years of age. Recruitment com-
missions went from town to town, but most men managed to escape and 
join those who were already in the mountains, while Serbian women publicly 
protested against the Bulgarians. Enough was enough: in the night between 
21 and 22 February Serbian chetniks led by vojvoda Kosta Vojinović raised 
81 AJ, MIP-DU, 334-22, n. 3377, Bulgarian Ministry of Education to presidents of 
“three-member commissions” in the new regions and occupied territories (and for in-
formation and request of assistance to His Eminence Metropolitan and Archibishops, 
to Prefects, Commandants and Sub-Prefects), 26/02/1916.
82 Rapport, vol. I, doc. 30, Reiss, “La ville de Vrania”, 81–85.
83 Ibid. doc. 32, account of R. A. Reiss, “Sourdolitza”, 97–98.
84 Stojančević, Srbija i srpski narod, chap. “Nacionalno-politički i medjunarodni položaj 
Srbije u 1916. godini”, 38; Perović, Toplički ustanak, 37-38; Kuhne, Les Bulgares peints 
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a rebellion against the Bulgarian occupying forces and attacked garrisons in 
the region of Toplica. Within a few days they liberated Kuršumlija, Proku-
plje, Lebane and many other towns and villages. Bulgarian troops were not 
able to defeat them, and General Kutinchev was replaced. In early March 
Colonel Protogerov became the new (temporary) chief of the Morava Area. 
The Supreme Command chose him because of his experience in guerrilla 
warfare and his activity in the pro-Bulgarian IMRO organization: for Pro-
togerov, born in Macedonia (Ohrid), the Serbs were the worst enemy and he 
was ready to fight them in every possible way. When appointing Protogerov, 
the Bulgarian Supreme Command knew that the repression would be bru-
tal, and this probably was its intention, too. The IMRO leader organized the 
repression after receiving the full power to do so. On 10 March he issued an 
order to the chetniks to surrender within five days, or otherwise they would 
be sentenced under the new law passed by the Sobranie just a few days 
before:85 they would be executed, their homes burnt down and their fami-
lies deported.86 None of the Serbian insurgents wanted to give up fighting, 
and this order gave Protogerov and his army the opportunity to destroy the 
entire Morava. It took Protogerov fifteen days to defeat the chetniks, and 
his army would leave a trail of death and destruction wherever it passed: 
civilians became target of repression, tens of villages were destroyed, thou-
sands of inhabitants killed, everything was pillaged and a mass rape crime 
took place.87 Crimes continued even after the chetniks were defeated: in 
late April (probably), Protogerov was replaced by another temporary chief, 
Colonel Tasev, while Lieutenant Colonel Dŭrvingov, chosen by Protogerov, 
was assigned as his chief of staff. More destruction took place, especially 
in July and August, when Dŭrvingov and Tasev organized counter-units 
with the duty to track and destroy the still active chetnik groups; the units 
were composed of IMRO comitadjis sent from Macedonia, and they not 
only abused the freedom of action they had been given but continued the 
destruction and extermination of Serbian villages and civilians started by 
Protogerov. They acted in perfect symbiosis with the Bulgarian government, 
whose aim was to quell the rebellion and resume the process of Bulgariza-
tion in the region, but they were not just executors of Bulgarian policy; like 
Protogerov, they had freedom of action too, and they used it to eradicate the 
very existence of Serbs in the zones under Bulgarian occupation.
85 Ljubomir Jovanović, Pobuna u Toplici i Jablanici: govor u Narodnoj Skupštini 12. aprila 
1918. godine na Krfu (Belgrade: Geca Kon, 1918), 34–36.
86 AJ, MIP-DU, 334-20, Kum naselenieto ot Moravskata voenno-inspektsionna oblast, 
10/03/1917; also in French in AJ, 336-2 and in Rapport, vol. I, doc. 66, 269–270.
87 See Rapport, Ljubomir Jovanović, R. A. Reiss, etc.Balcanica XLIV (2013) 382
The result of Protogerov’s and Tasev-Dŭrvingov’s repression was the 
worst ever seen. In the region that was the centre of the uprising more than 
sixty Serbian villages were completely destroyed,88 but the same happened 
in many other regions outside Toplica. About 20,000 civilians were killed 
and more than 80,000 were deported to pre-war Bulgaria89 (women and 
children, but also recruited men sent to forced labour); apart from this, it 
was impossible to count every individual act of violence, especially rapes, 
because of their frequency. The Austro-Hungarian consul in Niš reported 
that Bulgarians burnt down all villages in the areas where the Toplica revolt 
took place.90
Through the city of Sofia often passed convoys of hundreds of civil-
ians heading for unknown destinations, for concentration camps; the condi-
tions they were held in were often inhuman,91 and, just as in 1915 and 1916, 
many civilians had to walk all the way to their destinations. The existing 
camps for prisoners of war in Bulgaria could not receive so many people 
even if used to full capacity (which they had already been), so Bulgarian au-
thorities built other camps only for civilians. As far as we know, there were 
from 1916 to the end of the war at least twenty active concentration camps 
for Serbian civilians in pre-war Bulgaria; in many of them conditions were 
so terrible that deaths were a daily occurrence. The Inter-allied Commission 
recorded numerous testimonies about the life in concentration camps and 
horrible treatment they received; it did not interview only Serbian survivors 
(militaries and civilians), but also Italian, British and French prisoners of 
war who witnessed what was going on.92
Among the large number of testimonies given to the Inter-allied 
Commission or to others, those about the camp at Sliven are the ones that 
have to be considered carefully. The camp was built in 1915 for prisoners 
88 Jovanović, Pobuna u Toplici, 63.
89 Rapport, vol. I, doc. 35, account of R. A. Reiss “Ville de Prokouplie et environs”, 117.
90 Mitrović, Srbija u Prvom svetskom ratu, 369.
91 Rapport, vol. I, doc. 52, 241–242, and vol. III, doc. 246; AJ, 336-23-212: Podaci o 
ratnim zločinima Bugara u Srbiji, 8. 
92 On the camp of Khaskovo see Rapport, vol. II, doc. 98, 24–25; on Plovdiv: AJ, MIP-
DU, 334-22, testimony of Serbian Captain Okolitchani; Rapport, doc. 92, 7; Kenneth 
Steuer, Pursuit of an “Unparalleled opportunity”, The American YMCA and Prisoner of War 
Diplomacy among the Central Power Nations during World War I (1914–1923) (www.
gutemberg-e.org/steuer), chap. 10, 5; on Gornje Paničarevo: Rapport, vol. II, doc. 95, 15; 
on Shumen: Rapport, vol. III, doc. 287, 182–184; and vol. III, doc. 224. See also Isidor 
Djuković, “Izveštavanje delegata srpske Vrhovne komande iz Bugarske (oktobar – de-
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of war, but when civilians started to arrive in 1916, it became a “punitive 
camp”.93
When Greece joined the Entente in July 1917, Greek prisoners of 
war and civilians from Thrace were interned in this camp and received the 
same treatment as the Serbs did;94 at the same time thousands of Serbs were 
brought from the Morava region, so the camp became too small to receive 
them all. For this reason, a “lesser camp” with 28 barracks offering the most 
inhumane conditions one could imagine was built: there were slits but no 
windows, and internees had neither beds nor hay or blankets to cover them-
selves with. Out of 80–100 persons packed together in each of these bar-
racks only 20 or fewer survived.95 They received 300 to 800 grams of black 
bread per day and some kind of soup two or three times a week, and some 
meat on Sundays; they were so hungry that they ate grass or stole cattle 
hay.96 The so-called hospital was a far cry from the real one and in such a 
poor condition that many internees were dying.
The number of deaths caused by starvation, epidemics, winter cold 
exposure and violence was extremely high: it was recorded that between 
August and December 1917 alone there were 2,709 deaths, of which 1,490 
due to starvation.97 At the end of the war it was calculated that 4,142 Serbs, 
both prisoners of war and civilians, died in the camp, while about 2,000 died 
performing hard labour outside the camp.98
At the end of the war the Inter-allied Commission summed up the 
question of internment of civilians. Speaking about the Serbian internees, 
it stated:
The conditions in which the internees in the camps lived were so bad that 
one could think that their extermination was the main goal. Barracks were 
terrible: in some camps a part of internees lived without any shelter, in the 
open air. Those who had found a place in the barracks, sheds or tents, slept 
on a shelf or on the bare ground. Barracks were often very poorly built 
and leaked water. In the main camps they were crowded and even though 
the barracks could accommodate 20, as many as 100 persons lived inside; 
internees were kept without clothes, underwear and shoes […]. No dis-
infection took place, and there were no toilets […] virtually all internees 
93 Account of Mihailo Jovanović, 15/11/1918, published in Bojković & Pršić, Stradanje, 
311 (the original in AS, Fonds “Arhiva institucija pod bugarskom okupacijom”, box 2).
94 AJ, MIP-DU, 334-16, testimony of Todor Hristodulo; in French in Rapport, vol. III, 
doc. 229, 68–69.
95 Account of Mihailo Jovanović, 318 and 323.
96 Ibid. 321; AJ, MIP-DU, 334-20, testimony of Djordje Božinović.
97 Account of Mihailo Jovanović, 321.
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were infested with pests. Daily food ration in the main camps consisted of 
200–600 grams of bread, a soup without meat and with a bit of peppers. 
There was no sanitation, except in rare cases […]. Internees were forced to 
the worst hard labour […]. Murders were not rare because those who went 
out of their barracks to satisfy a physiological need during the night could 
be shot or beaten to death with rifle butts by guards. […] The number of 
deaths in concentration camps because of privations, epidemics and tor-
tures is very high. According to what we know, of 100,000 internees only 
50,000 returned home. In general, all those who did return are in very poor 
health.99
The forced Bulgarization of Macedonia and the Morava region, as 
well as violence and other types of crimes against civilians, continued until 
the end of the Great War, but were not as severe as in the period from 1915 
to 1917.  
Official politics continued to consider these regions as definitively 
annexed to Bulgaria, and the methods used from the beginning of occu-
pation, especially in the Morava region, were not only confirmed but also 
codified. Indicative in this sense is an order issued on 29 May 1918 by 
General Nerezov, head of the Morava Area from November 1917;100 its po-
litical content suggests that he received it from his superiors. The methods 
of Bulgarization, such as the exclusive use of Bulgarian, Bulgarian schools 
and ecclesiastical institutions, were reaffirmed, and the violence of this pro-
cess explicitly formulated: “To implement Bulgarization in this region it 
is necessary to destroy all myths, pillars and all elements of Serbdom and 
it is necessary that on their ruins should only remain the Bulgarian ones.” 
The population was divided into categories, first of all national: all Serbs 
(except those coming from Šumadija, the region on the other side of the 
Morava river) were considered as Bulgarians who had forgotten their ori-
gins – which official politics had been affirming from the beginning of the 
war – but there were many “Serbophiles” among them; Vlachs were not 
considered as enemies; Jews were seen as “politically amorphous”; Greeks 
as “dangerous enemies”; Turks and Roma, being present in small numbers, 
as “politically useless”. After national categorization, a social one followed, 
because each of these categories of people required a different method of 
Bulgarization to be implemented; men, children, the elderly and, above all, 
women were described in this way:
It has been indisputably established that most fanatic and violent chauvin-
ists are always women. They are the vital centre of the Serbian spirit and 
99 Rapport, vol. I, 19–21.
100 AJ, MIP-DU, 334-22, Zapoved po Moravskata Oblastna Voenna Inspektsia n. 13, 
29/05/1918; in Serbian in Bojković & Pršić, Stradanje; in French in Rapport, vol. I, doc. 
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the most important agents of the secret Serbian organization. Women are 
the main couriers of secret correspondence; they are the ideologists of the 
organization, the main agitators, they are the most astute supporters and 
aiders.
Bulgarization went on and other orders were issued, such as those, for 
example, introducing Bulgarian holidays with instructions for civilians how 
to celebrate them.101 But a few months later the Bulgarians lost the war and 
their crimes became known across Europe.
Conclusions
Considering the Inter-allied Commission’s report and the thirty-two viola-
tions of the laws of war codified in Paris, we have chosen here to present 
some aspects we perceive as crucial with regards to the question of large-
scale crimes committed against civilians in the Kingdom of Serbia by the 
Bulgarians during the First World War. There are many other questions 
we could not consider for various reasons. One of these, often presented 
in Serbian publications as a crime against civilians, we chose not to discuss 
because we are not sure it can be considered a crime in the strict sense of 
the word: starvation; as a matter of fact, while it was not listed as one of the 
violations committed by the Bulgarians in the Kingdom of Serbia, it was in 
the case of Greece. 
We know that lack of food was a big problem for civilians; they had 
to hand over a huge part of their produce to Bulgarian authorities; we also 
know that the situation lasted until the end of the war, so it can be said that 
food shortage became “the chief attribute of Bulgarian rule”.102 The people 
in the Morava region and Macedonia endured starvation to a much greater 
extent in 1918 than before, but the whole of Bulgaria also had to face a 
more terrifying internal enemy than the Entente’s guns: famine. The situa-
tion was desperate everywhere.
It is clear that this is a complicated issue that requires deeper re-
search, especially because the starvation in the Morava region and Macedo-
nia should be looked at in comparison to the starvation in Bulgaria and its 
causes, first of all the “allied depredation”,103 the German need for any avail-
101 AJ, MIP-DU, 334.22, n. 39318, Chief of Staff of Morava to all commandants, mili-
tary and civil offices of the Area, 30/05/1918.
102 Crampton, Bulgaria 1878–1918, 457.
103 The expression used by Crampton, Bulgaria 1878–1918, 456.Balcanica XLIV (2013) 386
able supply in order to cope with the British blockade of Germany which 
was killing tens of thousands of civilians in the Empire.104
Furthermore, a large available documentation suggests that the Bul-
garians tried to introduce an organized system of requisition in the oc-
cupied regions of Morava and Macedonia,105 but corruption and German 
exploitation posed an insurmountable obstacle.106
Likewise, some other questions cannot be addressed because they 
can be considered as crimes but not as a part of the official Bulgarization 
process. These crimes may not have been specifically ordered by Bulgarian 
political and military authorities but were tolerated: extortion, rape, looting, 
and other forms of brutal violence against the civilian population. The is-
sues addressed in this paper likewise need further research and discussion, 
such as the importance of studying the internment of Serbian civilians in 
Bulgaria within the more general question of civilian deportations during 
the First World War.
We still need to open many questions about what happened. We have, 
for example, to look at the crimes in Serbia and Macedonia in a comparative 
way, first of all considering other territories under Bulgarian occupation. 
In Eastern Macedonia, the Bulgarians systematically and intentionally let 
Greeks die of starvation, causing about 10,000 civilian deaths, and deported 
about 70,000 civilians from the region to concentration camps in pre-war 
Bulgaria, many of whom died because of the inhumane conditions.107 And 
we know that in Dobruja they “strengthened efforts to eliminate every as-
104 On the blockade of Germany see P. Vincent, The Politics of Hunger. The Allied Block-
ade of Germany, 1915–1919 (Athens, Ohio and London: Ohio University Press, 1985); 
Bruna Bianchi, “L’arma della fame. Il blocco navale e le sue conseguenze sui civili 
(1915–1919)”, DEP 13/14 (2010), 1–33 (www.unive.it/dep); A. B. Downes, “Targeting 
Civilians in War: the Starvation Blockades of World War I”, presented at the Annual 
Meeting of the American Political Science Association, 28–31 August 2003 (www.
allacademic.com/meta/p65599_hindex.html); N. P. Howard, “The Social and Political 
Consequences of the Allied Food Blockade of Germany, 1918–1919”, German History 
11/2 (1993), 161–188. 
105 See e.g. AJ, MIP-DU, 334-22, order no. 109 of the Military Intendancy of Morava: 
Dopŭlnitelni ukazaniia po izzemvaneto na zŭrnentite khrani, 9/08/1918; order no. 110, 
Dopŭlnitelni ukazaniia po izzemvaneto na trevniia furazha, 10/08/1918.
106 See e.g. AJ, MIP-DU, 334-22, order no. 222 of the Chief of Military Inspection 
Area Morava, 28/08/1918, and order no. 49, 29/08/1918; VA, p. 3, k. 178, f. 1, docs. 49 
and 50, testimonies of deserters from the Bulgarian army.
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pect of former Romanian domination with such care that today we could 
refer to it as a real ethnic cleansing”.108
All the questions raised above need further research and discussion. 
As we sought to explain here, it will be necessary to apply a methodology 
that involves a comparative approach inside the international dimension of 
the question of Bulgarian crimes against Serbian and non-Bulgarian popu-
lation in the occupied Kingdom of Serbia, the use of available sources, co-
operation between scholars of different countries and, of course, attention 
to the historical background. 
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